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Abstract
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The effect of Loan-to-Value restrictions on Norwegian household debt
by Joe¨l Heer and Vigdis Lund
Household debt has reached record high levels in Norway and is considered to be a threat to
the financial stability. To dampen the rapid accumulation of household debt and increasing
housing prices, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway has introduced loan-to-
value restrictions on mortgages of 90% in March 2010 and 85% in December 2011. This
study contributes empirical evidence of the effect of these loan-to-value restrictions on
Norwegian household debt. Firstly, we show that there are self-reinforcing effects between
housing prices and household debt, using a structural VARX model. Secondly, we extend
this particular model and show that the restrictions apparently have failed to dampen
household debt on an aggregate level. Thirdly, using a single-equation model for household
debt, we provide evidence that the restrictions have slowed down the growth in household
debt among young people. This effect, however, has been counteracted by an increase in
the older generation’s household debt, which can be explained by (grand)parent financing
as well as a higher willingness of holding debt among the elderly. We therefore conclude
that loan-to-value restrictions can be seen as a valuable tool for reducing the accumulation
of debt among the younger and more sensitive group. They may, however, have limited
power to dampen household debt on an aggregate level.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) re-
ported alarmingly high debt-to-income ratios in countries such as Denmark, Ireland, the
Netherlands and Norway (OECD, 2014). At moderate levels, debt improves welfare and
encourages growth (Cecchetti et al., 2011). Conversely, high debt may lead to vulnera-
bilities and undermine the macroeconomic stability. For instance, high public debt levels
may reduce the government’s ability to respond to future crises with expansionary fiscal
policies. In the eurozone, government debt has been soaring after the onset of the recent
global financial crisis, which Sutherland et al. (2012) suggest is because of a migration of
debt across balance sheets from the private sector to the public sector. According to IMF
(2012), the ratio of household debt to income rose by an average of 39 percentage points
to 138% in advanced economies in the five years preceding the recession of 2007. Hence,
in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the role of household debt has been brought into
the limelight of economic policy debates.
Ideally, high and low debt levels would be determined by fundamentals, but there is often
little consensus on what these are. Several economists do, however, stress the danger of
excessive household debt. For instance, IMF (2000) argues that recessions preceded by a
large build-up in household debt are more severe, as high debt levels can amplify slumps
and weaken the following recoveries. Empirical evidence suggests that when private debt
levels, particularly for the household sector, rise above trend, the likelihood of a recession
increases (Sutherland and Hoeller, 2012). Furthermore, in a study of the rising household
debt in several OECD countries, Debelle (2004b) argues that regardless of whether the
increase in household debt is sustainable, the greater indebtedness of households has
important macroeconomic implications.
1
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Hence, an issue for policymakers is whether they should impose measures against the
build-up of high debt levels, or clean the mess when a recession strikes. As a matter of
fact, the build-up of debt has previously been subject to benign neglect among politi-
cians, as monetary policy, i.e. increasing the interest rate, may be costly to deploy in
an otherwise healthy economy. However, the unexpectedly large loss in wealth due to
the recent global recession as well as sovereign debt crises in several European countries
appears to have changed this attitude. Policies are currently being deployed in several
countries to prevent a crisis of the same extent from reoccurring. Crowe et al. (2011) note
that macro-prudential regulations protecting against excessive credit growth are likely to
reduce the risk of such financial crises, and that these measures may be less costly than
monetary policy. However, these measures are relatively new and may therefore face some
practical implementation issues. As a consequence, the empirical evidence of the effect of
such measures is in general limited.
When assessing the potential risk of high household debt, it is important to note that
nearly all lending to households is mortgage related (OECD, 2014). Thus, understanding
the relationship between housing prices and household debt becomes crucial. As a matter
of fact, one of the causes of the financial crisis in the U.S. was the strong growth in
mortgages and a substantial rise in housing prices, which laid the basis for further growth
in mortgages. A large portion of this borrowing was held by households with poor debt
servicing ability. In particular, the drop in housing prices was the root of distress in the
market for mortgage-backed securities. When housing prices fell below the nominal value
of loans, both speculative buyers and home owners started to default and the value of
mortgage-backed securities began to decline. As a result, it became increasingly difficult
to obtain financing for both investors and issuers of these securities. Some were forced to
leave the market, and this in turn decreased the available funds for mortgage financing,
starting a downward spiral.
In Norway, average debt to disposable income has currently reached a record high of 212%,
which is among the highest levels worldwide. In comparison, the U.S. ratio was 110% be-
fore the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, housing prices adjusted by the consumption
deflator has increased by 191% from 1985 to 2013. As a result, both national and interna-
tional institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Finance, IMF and OECD) have stressed that the
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debt level in Norwegian households in conjunction with the high housing prices are consid-
erable risk factors for the financial stability in Norway (Finanstilsynet, 2014b). Therefore,
the FSA responded by introducing new macro-prudential tools as a part of more general
guidelines in March 2010, to ensure a more prudent mortgage lending practice. In these
guidelines, they defined a maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 90% of a property’s
market value. In December 2011, the guidelines were further tightened and the LTV ratio
was lowered to 85%. Even though four years have passed since the introduction of LTV
restrictions, they are still subject to heated discussions in Norway.
This study aims to contribute new and unique evidence to the debates which previously
have been based on political agendas rather than on economic arguments. The main
objective is to analyze the impact of the measures imposed, using empirical evidence from
Norway.
Previous empirical studies conducted for other countries have mainly concentrated on
single-equation setups to analyze the impact on household debt and housing prices. This
may, however, lead to endogeneity problems, as empirical evidence suggests that there is
a financial accelerator at work between the two variables. We therefore use a cointegrated
vector auto-regressive model with exogenous variables (VARX) and show that there is
a financial accelerator between housing prices and household debt. A slightly extended
version of this model is then used to show that the LTV restrictions apparently have failed
to dampen aggregate household debt. This study therefore contributes to the existing
literature by providing evidence of the limited effect of LTV restrictions on an aggregate
level, using a more sophisticated model that controls for self-reinforcing effects between
housing prices and credit.
Furthermore, we examine whether the restrictions have affected household debt among
age groups differently, which has important implications for financial stability. For that
purpose, we derive a linear model which allows us to study the different effects of the
LTV restrictions on household debt across age groups in the short run. The latter model
is estimated using the first difference method, and the results indicate a dampening effect
on household debt among the young. The elderly, however, were less affected by the LTV
restrictions, and they accumulated debt even faster after the tightening in 2011. This
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outcome can partly be explained by (grand)parent financing and a higher willingness to
hold debt among the elderly.
In general, we are able to provide a more nuanced analysis on the effect of this particular
macro-prudential tool.
The outline of this master thesis will be as following: Chapter 2 provides an overview of
the existing literature on the subject matter. A description of the development in housing
and credit markets in Norway is given in chapter 3, which also contains a short description
of the LTV restrictions. In chapter 4, we show evidence of the existence of a financial
accelerator between housing prices and credit. In chapter 5, we investigate the effect of
the LTV restrictions on aggregate household debt in Norway, while we study the different
impact of the LTV restrictions on household debt across age groups in chapter 6. Finally,
chapter 7 contains our conclusion.
2 Literature review
2.1 Potential problems with high household debt
Debelle (2004a) analyzes the role of household debt from a macroeconomic perspective.
The study concludes that the substantial rise in household debt over the preceding two
decades has made the household sector more sensitive to changes in interest rates, income
and asset prices. The author notes that this is particularly the case in countries with
mainly variable rate mortgages, as the household sector is more exposed to the risk of
fluctuation in interest rates. He further argues that even though household debt itself is
not likely to be the source of a negative shock in the economy, it could amplify recessions
caused by other sources. In addition, the study points out that macroeconomic implica-
tions of a greater indebtedness do not only depend on the aggregate level, but also on the
distribution of debt across the household sector.
Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) provide an overview of the literature regarding debt and
macroeconomic stability, and analyze the channels through which high debt level affects
this stability. In line with Debelle (2004a), the authors find that relatively high levels of
debt could increase the sectors’ sensitivity to changes in fundamentals, which can induce
households or firms to adjust their borrowing, consumption and investment behavior.
The authors also find that at higher debt levels, exposure to asset price movements may
become more of a problem for companies, governments and households, as a collapse in for
example housing prices reduces collateral. Hence, mortgage equity withdrawal available
for consumption smoothing becomes limited. The authors further note that high debt
levels can create weaknesses in balance sheets in one sector and migrate and spill over
5
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to other sectors. The authors point out that empirical evidence suggests that when debt
levels in the private sector, especially for households, rise above trend the probability of
a recession increases.
Cecchetti et al. (2011) study the turning point when debt goes from improving welfare
and enhancing growth to become damaging. The authors address the question by using
a data set that includes the level of government debt, non-financial corporate debt and
household debt in 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010. The analysis reveals that a
1% increase in household debt-to-GDP1 is associated with a 2.5 basis points reduction
in per capita GDP growth. Further, they find that household debt above a threshold of
approximately 85% of GDP will become a drag on growth. This result does, however,
lack statistical precision.
Another approach is applied by Barnes and Young (2003), who investigate the causes
behind the rising debt and its sustainability in the U.S. since the early 1970s. The authors
use an overlapping generation model where they assume that different generations have
different needs regarding borrowing and asset accumulation. They conclude that debt
levels chosen by households are sustainable as long as the expectations about income
growth, housing prices, interest rates and other determinants of borrowing that underlie
that decision are not falsified or revised.
In a working paper from Norges Bank2, Lindquist (2012) evaluates the sustainability of
household debt using a data set over the period 1987–2009. The author defines sustainabil-
ity of household debt as the debt households are able to service conditional on historical
consumption to income patterns. Furthermore, she stresses the importance of the distri-
bution of debt across age groups. As a matter of fact, it turns out that households aged
25–44, which are the primary first-time home buyers and second-steppers group, are found
to be vulnerable, when interest rates increase from the current very low levels. According
to Lindquist, this rises concerns from a financial stability perspective, as this particular
group holds 60% of household debt.
1GDP = Gross Domestic Product
2The Central Bank of Norway
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2.2 The long run relationship between household debt
and housing prices
Borio and Lowe (2002) show that sustained rapid credit growth combined with large
increases in asset prices appears to increase the likelihood of financial instability. Mian
and Sufi (2011) also argue that the relationship between household borrowing and housing
prices play an important role in macroeconomic fluctuations. The authors use individual-
level data and an instrumental variable methodology to estimate the magnitude of home-
equity based borrowing and identify which groups responded the most. Their analysis
shows that the strong increase in housing prices in the US in 2002–2006 resulted in existing
home owners borrowing significantly more debt. It is further argued that this home-equity
based borrowing channel may be an important source of the rapid rise in household
leverage that preceded the economic recession.
Many studies have analyzed bank lending and property prices separately, but explore the
link only in one direction and are often based on single-equation setups. For instance,
Collyns and Senhadji (2002) find empirical evidence that credit growth has a significant
effect on residential property prices, and conclude that bank lending is one explanation to
the real estate bubble in Asia. An example from Norway is Jacobsen and Naug (2004) who
try to determine household debt, using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. A general
problem with these studies is the potential two-way causality between bank lending and
property prices. This endogeneity problem implies that the studies may suffer from biased
results. In addition, they are unable to separate the direction of causality between credit
and property prices.
The theoretical foundation of a financial accelerator between housing prices and credit
is found in Bernanke and Gertler (1989). They construct an overlapping generations
model where financial market imperfections cause temporary shocks in net worth 3 to be
amplified. Inspired by Bernanke and Gertler’s work, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) conclude
that when the effects of a shock persist, the cumulative impact on asset prices, and hence
on net worth at the time of the shock, can be significant. The authors consider a model
3Net worth = Total assets minus total liabilities
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where they assume an economy where borrowers’ credit limits are affected by the prices of
the collateralized assets, and at the same time these prices are affected by the size of the
credit limits. Kyotaki and Moore find that the accelerator between credit limits and asset
prices is a powerful transmission mechanism where effects of shocks persist, are amplified,
and spread out.
The two-way causality can give rise to mutually reinforcing cycles in credit and property
markets. The coincidence of cycles in bank credit and property prices has been widely
discussed in literature oriented around policies (e.g. IMF (2000) and BIS (2001)). How-
ever, there are few studies based on empirical research focusing on the interaction between
bank lending and property prices. There is currently no consensus in literature on the
direction of causality between the two variables. Differing methodological approaches, dif-
ferent data sets, sample sizes and institutional differences between countries may explain
some of these discrepancies. The empirical findings on the interaction between housing
prices and credit are listed in table 2.1.
Author(s) ph → d ph ← d ph ↔ d
Hoffmann (2003) *
Gerlach and Peng (2005) *
Oikarinen (2009) *
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007) *
Gimeno and Martinez-Carrascal (2010) *
Anundsen and Jansen (2013) *
Table 2.1: Evidence of the long-run relationship between housing prices (ph) and
credit (d).
Hofmann (2003) analyzes the patterns of dynamic interaction between bank lending and
property prices, based on quarterly data from 20 countries in the period 1985–2001. In
a similar study, Gerlach and Peng (2005) examine the relationship between credit to the
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private sector and housing prices in Hong Kong. Both studies estimate a long run coin-
tegrating relationship between real bank lending and real property prices. In Hofmann’s
article, the results suggest that the long run causality goes in both directions, but that the
effect from property prices to bank lending appears to be stronger than in the opposite
direction. Gerlach and Peng obtain the same result, that is, causality runs from property
prices to lending, rather than conversely. Following these studies, Oikarinen (2009) shows
that there has been a significant two-way interaction between housing prices and mort-
gages in Finland using a quarterly dataset in the period 1975–2006. Oikarinen estimates a
long-run relationship for housing prices as a function of GDP and the loan-to GDP ratio.
Oikarinen’s results, however, suggest that the direction of causality goes from household
lending to housing prices in the long run.
Like Hofmann (2003), Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007) analyze the long-run dependence
between housing prices and credit in Ireland. In Ireland, property prices rose by 12%
annually in real terms between 1996 and 2002 in a rapidly growing economy with low
nominal interest rates. Particularly, Fitzpatrick and McQuinn explore the relationship
between credit growth and asset prices by adding a credit equation to an existing model
of the Irish housing market. Then, they estimate a cointegrating econometric model of
mortgage credit, housing prices, disposable income, real interest rates and demographic
variables in order to coherently investigate the influence of credit and house prices on each
other. Fairly conclusive evidence of a mutually reinforcing relationship is found. They
further conclude that the effect of greater credit availability, ceteris paribus, means that
mortgage-holders have outstanding loans that are larger than what they otherwise would
have been if availability had been curtailed.
Gimeno and Martinez-Carrascal (2010) use a similar econometric methodology to study
the interaction between housing prices and household borrowing in Spain with quarterly
data for the period 1984–2009. In the study, they focus on house purchase loans rather
than total bank lending and total household lending, as they expect this variable to be
more closely linked to housing prices. Further, they include interest rates as a determinant
of the credit aggregate in the long run. The cointegration analysis indicates that both
variables are interdependent in the long run. Loans for house purchase depend positively
on housing prices, while housing prices adjust when this credit aggregate departs from
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the level implied by its long-run determinants. In contrast, disequilibria in housing prices
are corrected only through changes in this variable.
Anundsen and Jansen (2011) adopt the same econometric approach as Gimeno and
Martinez-Carrascal to analyze the relationship between housing prices and credit in Nor-
way over the period 1986 Q2 to 2008 Q4. The study has been extended in Anundsen and
Jansen (2013). They apply a structural vector equilibrium correction model (SVECM)
to examine both the long-run interaction and the short-run dynamics between the two
variables. The authors find that real housing prices are dependent on household debt,
real disposable income and housing stock, while real debt in the long run depends on the
real housing prices, real interest rate and the housing turnover. Thus, they find a mutual
dependency between housing prices and household debt in the long run. This two-way
interaction means that higher housing prices lead to a credit expansion, which in turn puts
an upward pressure on housing prices. This results from Anundsen and Jansen (2011) has
been confirmed by Jacobsen and Vatne (2011).
2.3 The effect of LTV ratios: Theory and Empirical
Evidence
In an IMF discussion note, Crowe et al. (2011) evaluate different policy options to deal with
real estate booms. The authors argue that what matters may not be the boom itself, but
rather how the boom is funded. Booms financed through credit with leveraged institutions
directly involved have tended to be followed by a more costly bust, and should hence be
the focus of policy. The problem with using monetary policy is that it is both blunt and
costly in dealing with real estate booms, given that the macroeconomic environment is
calm. The reason for this is that the interest hikes needed to stop the boom may be costly
in terms of output gap and desired inflation rates (Crowe et al., 2011). Macro-prudential
tools, such as maximum loan-to-value ratios, however, appear to have the best chance to
curb a boom, as their narrower focus also reduces the costs of using them. Their potential
impact is to limit household leverage and housing prices appreciation while decreasing
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probability of default. However, the authors argue that such macro-prudential tools may
suffer from loopholes.
From an empirical perspective, there is little evidence for the effectiveness of these specific
tools due to the fact that macro-prudential policy frameworks are still in their infancy.
Lamont and Stein (1999) show that in cities where a greater fraction of homeowners have
high LTV ratios, housing prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as
changes in per-capita income. Almeida et al. (2006) also provide evidence that economic
activity is more sensitive to movements in housing prices if the LTV ratio is higher. The
results of the empirical analysis indicate that debt capacity is more strongly procyclical 4
in countries with high LTV ratios, and that the procyclicality of debt capacity affects
housing price dynamics through a collateral constraint.
Igan and Kang (2011) investigate the effect of the loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income
(DTI) limits on housing prices dynamics, residential real estate market activity, and house-
hold leverage, using empirical evidence from Korea. A baseline regression is estimated
separately for each equation of interest, i.e. the real estate and mortgage markets, using
ordinary least squares. In addition to a matrix of control variables, dummy variables for
both one, three and six months before and after a rule change are constructed. The as-
sumed two-way relationship between housing prices and credit, however, makes it difficult
to separate the causal effect of LTV and DTI limit adjustments. The analysis suggests that
price appreciation slows down in a six-month window and that the expected increase in
housing prices decline after policy intervention. They do not, however, find evidence that
potential first-time buyers are more likely to postpone the plans to buy a home. These
findings suggest that tighter lending practices, especially related to LTV restrictions, curb
expectations and speculative incentives. Hence, the authors argue that limits on LTV can
be effective tools to dampen real estate booms and restrain the associated risks. Con-
trary to the authors’ expectations, they do not find evidence of the expected negative link
between the growth of household leverage and the tightening of macro-prudential rules.
4Procyclicality: The tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend during the economic
cycle. Increased procyclicality thus means fluctuations with broader amplitude.
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Wong et al. (2011) evaluate maximum LTV ratios based on Hong Kong’s experience
and cross-country evidence. They perform an econometric analysis of panel data from
13 countries, using dummy variables for economies with LTV policies. The estimation
results show that LTV policy enhances banking stability by reducing the responsiveness
of mortgage default risk to property price shocks. When assessing the effectiveness of
LTV policy as a tool for stabilizing property markets, the authors specify a generalized
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model with dummies. Two of
the property market indicators they use are the real property price growth and mortgage
loans to GDP. Using quarterly data from Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore, which have all
adopted LTV policies, the estimation results show that the dampening effect of LTV policy
on household leverage is more apparent than the effect on property market activities. The
indirect effect of the LTV policy through the impact of household leverage on the property
market is ignored in the analysis, and is thus a caveat when interpreting the results.
Price (2014) analyzes the effects of LVR restrictions 5 implemented in October 2013 in
New Zealand. A vector autoregression (VAR) modelling framework is specified to estimate
the historical relationships between housing market variables. A counterfactual scenario is
then constructed as a forecast based on these historical relationships, starting in Septem-
ber 2013 (to allow for pre-implementation effects). The results of the analysis show that
house price inflation declined below the counterfactual scenario, although not significantly.
Housing-related credit growth declined, reaching 0,9% below the counterfactual scenario.
As examined in this chapter, literature suggests that high aggregate household debt as
well as the distribution of debt across age groups have important implications for financial
stability. LTV restrictions may remedy the accumulation of high debt and its associated
risks. However, the empirical evidence on the effects of these measures are limited and
some of them may suffer from endogeneity problems, as they ignore the self-reinforcing
effects between housing prices and credit. In this context, it seems highly relevant to
analyze the effects of LTV restrictions using a model that controls for this potential
source of biased results. Furthermore, as far as we know, the impact on household debt
across age groups has not been examined yet.
5 LVR = LTV with a speed limit. The policy requires banks to restrict the share of mortgage lending
with LTVs over 80% to no more than 10% of their new mortgage flows
3 Credit market and housing prices
3.1 The credit market in Norway
3.1.1 Developments in household debt
In the period after World War II and up to the 1980s, the banks, which mainly consisted
of state lending institutions, were subject to strict quantitative regulations (Gjerdrem,
2010). After the gradual deregulation of the credit market in the 1980s, savings and
commercial banks took over the major part of residential mortgages. The deregulation
resulted in a bank lending boom, which can be seen from the sharp rise in debt growth
in Figure 3.1 (d).
In the late 1980s, Norway experienced increasing distress in the banking sector, which
eventually led to a banking crisis. The crisis reached its peak in 1991 when the second and
fourth largest banks with a combined market share of 24% lost all their capital (Steigum,
2011). The early part and the peak of the banking crisis coincided with the deepest post
World War II recession in Norway, severely reducing financial institutions’ willingness
to offer credit. Despite the recession, the Nordic countries were forced to increase real
interest to keep the exchange rate fixed relative to the strong German mark. In addition
to this, a major overhaul of the tax system came into force in 1992. Income tax rules in
Norway were changed to reduce tax deductions for nominal interest payments, which had
a dampening effect on demand for mortgage among households. Steigum (2011) argues
that this asymmetric shock was “bad luck and triggered a rapid decline in asset prices”.
This led to a fall in real household debt, which is evident in Figure 3.1 (b).
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At the end of 1992, Norges Bank reduced the key policy rate1 quite extensively after the
European Exchange Rate System broke down (Fordelingsutvalget, 2009). The reduction
in the key policy rate quickly transmitted to the banks’ lending rates, reducing households’
borrowing costs. The real interest rate after tax was reduced from 7% to below 4%. In
1994, the Norwegian economy entered a period of high growth, even though unemployment
remained fairly high from a historical perspective. As a result, real household debt began
to rise again in the late 1990s, though at a moderate pace.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Nominal household debt in trillion NOK. (b) Real household debt
in trillion NOK. (c) Household debt deflated by price index, base year 1980 Q1. (d)
Annual growth rate in real household debt. (1980 Q1 – 2013 Q3)
During the IT boom in 2000, Norges Bank increased the key policy rate to prevent high
inflation. In March 2001, the inflation targeting goal was implemented. When the IT
bubble burst, the key policy rate was reduced from 7% in December 2002 to 1.75% in
March 2004. Along with increased competition in the banking sector and better mortgage
1the interest rate on banks’ deposits
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lending arrangements, mortgages became cheaper for the households, reaching approxi-
mately the same price level as in the early 1950s. In addition, the economic growth picked
up both internationally and in Norway. This brought the unemployment rate down to
2.5%, the lowest rate in 20 years. Consequently, mortgage lending increased substantially
in the period 2004–2006. On average, the growth in household debt has been very high
since the mid-1990s with two considerable drops during the IT burst in 2002 and in the
wake of the financial crisis in 2008 (see Figure 3.1 (d)). The crises did, however, only lead
to a relatively short downturn in the Norwegian economy, and growth in household debt
was quickly back on high levels. At the end of 2013, household debt reached 2823 bn.
NOK in Norway, which is over 200% of disposable income (Statistics Norway, 2014) (see
Figure 3.1 (a)).
3.1.2 Household debt across age groups
The younger part of the population has the highest debt-to-income ratio. In addition,
the share of households with debt three times larger than income has increased the most
among young couples, couples with small children and single parents. A possible reason
for this may be that high loans required to enter the housing market combined with a
lower relative income early in the career.
In Figure 3.2 (a), it appears that nominal household debt has increased not only for the
young generation, but for all age groups in the period 1993–2012. However, in the age
group 25–34, the number of indebted households declined from 2000–2010 (see Figure 3.2
(d)), which may partly explain why the same age group reduced its share of total debt
after 2000 (see Figure 3.2 (c)). Lindquist (2012) notes that particularly the age groups
above 55 show an increasing share with debt, indicating that it has become more common
among older households to hold debt. This is also evident in Figure 3.2 (b), where it
appears that the older age groups have experienced high growth rates in debt since 2002.
Lindquist argues that the reason for this may be explained by parents providing financial
support to their children, helping them enter the housing market. From 2009 to 2012,
this development appears to have continued.
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Figure 3.2: (a) Nominal household debt across age groups in billion NOK. (b) Annual
growth rate across age groups. (c) Debt distribution across age groups. (d) Number of
indebted persons in thousands. (1993–2012)
3.2 Housing prices
The Norwegian housing market remained fairly stable from the 1970s to the mid-1980s
(see Figure 3.3 (a)). Real housing prices, however, fell by almost 10% from the first quar-
ter of 1982 to the third quarter of 1984 (See Figure 3.3 (b)). The gradual easing of credit
regulations in the 1980s combined with low interest rates initiated a mortgage financed
boom in the housing market in the mid-1980s (with a nominal increase in housing prices
of almost 60% in the period 1984–1988) (Gjerdrem, 2010). A major drop in the oil price
in 1985–1986 contributed to the authorities tightening the economic policy (Fordeling-
sutvalget, 2009). The following economic recession and high real interest rates around
7-8% resulted in a large fall in housing prices. The tax reform, as mentioned earlier, also
contributed to the decline in the housing market. Real housing prices dropped by 42%
from the peak in the beginning of 1988 to the lowest point in 1993.
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Recovering from the trough in 1993, the housing prices increased more or less until the
financial crisis in 2007. One minor exception was in late 2002 until early 2003, when
housing prices had a slight drop due to a small recession in the Norwegian economy. From
1993 to 2007, nominal housing prices almost tripled, while real housing prices increased by
183%. During the financial crisis, real housing prices fell by 14% from 2007Q2–2008Q4.
Current housing prices in Norway are at record high levels and have in the past 25 years
increased twice as much as consumer prices (see Figure 3.3 (c)). Since the previous peak
in 2007, housing prices have risen by 31% to the next peak in 2013 (Finanstilsynet, 2014a).
Through 2013, however, the growth in housing prices declined (see Figure 3.3 (d)). From
a twelve-month growth of 8.2% in February 2013, the growth rate fell every month and
became negative in December 2013. In March 2014 the growth rate became positive again.
Nevertheless, housing prices are still record high.
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Figure 3.3: (a) Nominal housing price index. (b) Real housing price index. (c) Housing
price index deflated by price index, base year 1980 Q1. (d) Real growth rate in housing
prices. (1980 Q1–2013 Q3)
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Over the last 30 years, housing prices deflated by wage growth have reached the current
level on three different occasions. The first time was before the banking crisis and the
second time was before the financial crisis, while the latter occurred in 2013. The com-
mon denominator following all of these events was that housing prices or the growth in
housing prices halted. A crucial difference between the banking crisis around 1990 and
the situation today is that the current real after-tax interest rate is low, while aggregated
household debt is at a considerably higher level. Thus, a fall in housing prices is likely
to deteriorate household net wealth, affecting consumption negatively. The aim of the
new guidelines was to “promote solid institutions and financial stability and to safeguard
consumer interests” (Finanstilsynet, 2011b). The guidelines2 were a part of general-good
rules designed to maintain financial stability in Norway, and therefore applied to Norwe-
gian banks, financial institutions, as well as to foreign banks’ branches in the country.
3.3 LTV restrictions
Since 1994, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSA) has conducted annual
surveys on banks’ mortgage lending practices with the aim of revealing structural de-
velopment trends in the Norwegian mortgage loan market. In the last decade, a rising
debt burden has been observed along with a greater use of interest-only facilities and
longer terms to maturity. The surveys further show a substantial increase in the share
of mortgages with a LTV ratio above 80%, while the share of the more secure loans with
a LTV ratio below 60% has fallen. In a report from 2010, Finanstilsynet (2011a) stated
that debt has increased the most among groups with the highest debt-to-income ratios.
In Norway, bank lending to households accounts for around 60% of overall lending to the
private sector, of which 90% is secured by dwellings. Thus, Norwegian banks have an
indirect exposure to the housing market (See Figure 3.4). The FSA expressed concerns
that many Norwegian households were vulnerable to a hike in interest rates or economic
setbacks. Thus, to dampen the build-up of risk in the household sector, the FSA issued
guidelines for residential mortgage lenders in March 2010.
2The complete list of guidelines is listed in Appendix F.
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Figure 3.4: Vulnerabilities in the Norwegian banking sector, November 2012. A value
of 0, i.e. origo, denotes the lowest level of risk or vulnerability. A value of 10 denotes
the highest level of risk or vulnerability. Source: Norges Bank (2012).
Among the guidelines in 2010, a more specific rule was introduced, requiring that
• Loans should normally not be given with an LTV ratio above 90%.
However, due to continued high growth in household debt and housing prices, the guide-
lines were tightened in December 2011:
• Loans should normally not be given with an LTV ratio above 85%.
Furthermore, when assessing the borrower’s debt servicing capacity, the revised guidelines
advise the banks to make allowance for an increase in the interest rate of at least 5
percentage points. When the above threshold value is exceeded, the guidelines require
additional collateral or a special prudential assessment. According to OECD (2014), this
applied to 15% of the new loans by the autumn of 2013.
Chapter 3. Credit market and housing prices 20
Before the guidelines had been implemented in 2010, it was common that banks had their
own general rules regarding mortgage lending. Mortgage lending in Norway has tradi-
tionally been based on the value of collateral and debt-servicing capacity. Banks have for
example used a rule of thumb that loans should not exceed three times household income
(Norges Bank, 2006), while annual household LTV-ratios around 80% have been most
common (Finanstilsynet, 2008). Nevertheless, mortgage surveys prior to 2010 revealed
that banks have increasingly deviated from these general rules.
The new requirements have been criticized for affecting mostly young people who may
actually have an adequate debt servicing capacity. The graph below shows the develop-
ments in the demand for loans to first-time home buyers and other loans, according to a
quarterly survey conducted by Norges Bank. In the two quarters following the introduc-
tion of the LTV restriction, loans to first-time home buyers experienced a fall in demand.
The demand for the loans to first-time home buyers responded more negatively than the
other loans, and this was particularly the case right after the tightening in December 2011
(see Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.5: Household credit demand (secured on dwellings). Net percentage balances
are calculated by weighting together the responses in the survey. 2007 Q4 – 2013 Q3.
Source: Norges Bank (2013).
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Then again, Finance Norway’s household survey from 2013 concluded that 4 out of 10
receive help from parents when buying a dwelling, which is a doubling from 2010 numbers
(Finans Norge, 2014). Parents can help finance the down payment requirement by for
example giving advancement on inheritance or loans using home equity credit lines. Finans
Norge (2014) as well as Lindquist (2012) point out that the increase in debt growth is
highest among the age group 40–60.
Another alternative to parent financing has been acquiring loans from the State Housing
Bank3, which is the Norwegian government’s main implementing agency for housing policy.
According to Husbanken (2014), the main part of start-up loans has been granted to
young people entering the housing market for the first time. In 2013, however, this
share decreased as the State Housing Bank instructed the municipalities to prioritize the
groups more likely to remain economically disadvantaged. In the years from 2010–2012,
the amount of start-up loans increased from 5.527 to 7.473 billion NOK. From 1st of April
2014, the government further tightened the rules for receiving start-up loans for first time
buyers from the State Housing Bank, as this would undermine FSA’s tool for reducing
the increasing debt (Kommunal- og Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2014).
3Husbanken
4 Self-reinforcing effects between hous-
ing prices and credit
Our main interest is to find evidence that the guidelines regarding the LTV restrictions
have a dampening effect on household debt. As emphasized in chapter 2, there may be a
bi-directional causality between housing prices and credit. The potential existence of such
a financial accelerator implies that single-equations setups may suffer from an endogeneity
problem. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is
to provide evidence of self-reinforcing effects between housing prices
and household debt.
For that purpose, we re-estimate a model presented by Anundsen and Jansen (2013),
using a data set over a longer time horizon. There are two main reasons that justify this
choice. Firstly, it enables us to find a long-run relationship between housing prices and
credit, even though both time series exhibit I(1) behavior. Secondly, a slight extension of
this framework can be used to analyze the impact of the LTV restrictions on household
debt in chapter 5.
This chapter is structured as following: In section 4.1, we present the underlying theoret-
ical framework. In section 4.2, we derive the empirical framework. Finally, we perform
a cointegration analysis and compare the results with Anundsen and Jansen’s findings in
section 4.3.
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4.1 Theoretical model
The theoretical model includes two equations, one for the determination of real housing
prices and one for the determination of real household debt. The determination of real
housing prices at the aggregate level in a long-run equilibrium is given by
PHt = f(Dt, Y Ht, Rt, Ht), (4.1)
where housing prices PH is a function of real household debt D, real disposable income
Y H, the real after-tax interest rate R and the housing stock H. Equation (4.1) expresses
the market clearing price for any given level of the housing stock. The partial effects are
expected to be
∂f
∂D
> 0,
∂f
∂Y H
> 0,
∂f
∂R
≷ 0, ∂f
∂H
< 0. (4.2)
Higher household debt and higher disposable income are expected to increase housing
prices, while an increase in housing services works in the opposite direction. The partial
effect of the real after-tax interest rate, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, a
higher interest rate indirectly affects housing prices through disposable income and real
household debt — variables which we control for in equation (4.1). On the other hand,
there is a direct substitution effect which can have either sign from a theoretical point of
view.
The determination of real household debt at the aggregate level in a long-run equilibrium
is given by
Dt = g(PHt, Y Ht, Rt, THt, Ht), (4.3)
where real household debt D is a function of housing prices PH, real disposable income
Y H, the real after-tax interest rate R, the housing turnover TH and the housing stock H.
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Equation (4.3) is an extended version of Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007), where Anundsen
and Jansen have included the additional explanatory variables housing turnover, TH , and
housing stock, H. The partial effects are expected to be
∂g
∂PH
> 0,
∂g
∂Y H
> 0,
∂g
∂R
< 0,
∂g
∂TH
> 0,
∂g
∂H
> 0. (4.4)
In other words, we expect that higher housing prices, higher disposable income, higher
activity in the housing market and an increase in the housing stock all lead to higher
household debt, whereas a higher interest rate has a negative impact on household debt.
4.2 Data set and Empirical model
4.2.1 Data set
All variables that enter the model are provided by Statistics Norway1. Our sample covers
the period 1986 Q4 – 2013 Q3, since we do not have data for the number of housing
transactions prior to 1985 Q1. All data are seasonally unadjusted. Moreover, most data
have been revised compared with the data used by Anundsen and Jansen. In particular,
we found that the statistics for household debt reveal a structural break in 1995 Q4. How
we handle this issue, will be explained in section 4.2.2 and appendix D.
4.2.2 Empirical model
First of all, we perform a logarithmic transformation of the variables in equation (4.1)
and (4.3), which can be seen as a linearization of the theoretical model. The exception
is the interest rate, which is kept on level form. Therefore, variables on logarithmic form
are indicated by small letters, while we use capital letters for level-form variables.
1See Appendix A.1.
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Since all variables in equation (4.1) and (4.3) are usually found to be non-stationary and
integrated of first order, Anundsen and Jansen suppose that there should be a cointe-
grated relationship between housing prices and household debt conditioning on the other
variables2. Hence, we formulate a I(1) cointegrated VARX(p,q) system, where housing
prices, household debt and disposable income are the endogenous variables, while condi-
tioning on the interest rate, housing turnover and housing stock. We further assume that
the housing stock has no impact in the short term. Following Harbo et al. (1998), we
include a deterministic trend, which is restricted to lie in the cointegrated space, as well
as a constant term and centered seasonal dummies. We also include dummy variables in
order to control for a structural break in the household debt statistics. For that purpose,
we specify the dummy variables as proposed by Johansen et al. (2000) so that we allow
for structural breaks both in the trend variable as well as in the constant term 3. All in all,
we can formulate the VARX(p,q) system as a vector error correction model VECM(p,q)
(see e.g. Johansen (1988), Johansen (1995) and Juselius (2006)) given by

Δpht
Δdt
Δyht
 = Π

pht−1
dt−1
yht−1
Rt−1
tht−1
ht−1
t
t ∙ E2,t

+
p∑
i=1
Γi

Δpht−i
Δdt−i
Δyht−i
+
q−1∑
i=0
Ψi
ΔRt−i
Δtht−i

+ Φ

μ1
μ2 ∙ E2,t
CS1t
CS2t
CS3t

+
p∑
i=1
κ2,iD2,t−i +

ε1t
ε2t
ε3t
 ,
(4.5)
2A set of I(1) variables is defined as cointegrated if a linear combination of them is stationary.
3The specification of the structural break dummies is given in appendix D.
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where
Π = αβ ′ =

α1,ph α1,d
α2,ph α2,d
α3,ph α3,d

βph,1 βd,1 βyh,1 βR,1 βth,1 βh,1 βt,1 βsb,1
βph,2 βd,2 βyh,2 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 βt,2 βsb,2
 . (4.6)
The error terms

ε1t
ε2t
ε3t
 are assumed to be independently Gaussian distributed.
4.3 Cointegration analysis
4.3.1 Methodology
The final empirical model4 has been found by Anundsen and Jansen, using a general-to-
specific modelling approach. This approach involves several steps in order to ensure that
the final model represents a valid formulation of the theoretical model given by equation
(4.1) and (4.3). Since a general-to-specific approach is data sensitive, we perform all the
different tests5 on our own data set instead of just using the final model.
First of all, we test the time series for stationarity by applying an Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. Second, using information criteria and F-tests we analyse the optimal lag
length of the variables. Third, we perform Johansen’s trace test to determine the number
of cointegration relationships. After having decided the rank of the cointegration matrix,
we normalize the equations with respect to housing prices and private debt respectively,
and impose identifying restrictions. Finally, we successively introduce overidentifying
restrictions and test them for validity.
4The final empirical model reported in panel 5, p. 17, in Anundsen and Jansen (2013).
5For a detailed description of the tests applied, see Brooks (2008), Doornik and Hendry (2009a, 2009b).
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4.3.2 Stationarity test
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) indicate that all variables
exhibit non-stationarity on level form6. Moreover, they become stationary when being
differenced once, that is, the time series are I(1). The exception, however, is the time
series for housing stock, which reveals I(2) behavior. Nevertheless, we follow Anundsen
and Jansen (2013) and treat all variables integrated of order one at most.
4.3.3 Lag length test
Defining an appropriate lag length for both endogenous and exogenous variables is es-
sential in a VARX model. We therefore start with a lag length equal of 7 and test the
validity of lag reductions for the exogenous variables.
Consequently, we performed lag reduction tests based on information criteria such as
Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn and Akaike, as well as F-tests. The results indicate that the
optimal lag length for the exogenous variables would be zero7. Nonetheless, we decided
to choose the same lag length for the exogenous variables as Anundsen and Jansen, that
is, including one lag for the exogenous variables.
As a result, the endogenous variables enter the model with 7 lags, while the exogenous
variables have a lag length equal to 18.
6The results are reported in appendix B.
7The results are reported in appendix C.
8Anundsen and Jansen used only 5 lags for the endogenous variables. This specification, however,
produced unstable estimates when using our data.
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4.3.4 Trace test
After having decided the lag length, we proceed to test for cointegration relationships by
performing Johansen’s trace test (Johansen, 1988). The usual critical values, however, are
no longer valid due to the fact that our model includes three exogenous variables. The
appropriate critical values are obtained from table 13 in Doornik (2003), and are reported
along with the results in table 4.1.
The results show that there are two cointegrated vectors — housing prices and household
debt. Residual diagnostics show that there is neither autocorrelation nor heteroskedas-
ticity. However, the vector normality test indicates that the residuals are not normally
distributed9.
Eigenvalue λi H0 H1 λtrace Crit. value 5%
0.332 r = 0 r ≥ 1 85.872 64.48
0.221 r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 41.472 40.95
0.119 r ≤ 2 r = 3 13.980 20.89
Diagnostics Test statistic Value [p-value]
Vector AR 1-5 test: F(45,199) 1.352 [0.087]
Vector Normality test: χ2(6) 45.490 [0.000]
Vector Hetero test: F(276,354) 1.170 [0.086]
Table 4.1: Trace test. Estimation period: 1986 Q4 – 2013 Q3.
9Graphic residuals analysis reveals that the rejection of normality may be due to the fact that there
are outliers at the time of the structural break.
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4.3.5 General-to-specific modelling
In order to test for overidentifying restrictions, we start with normalizing the cointegrated
vectors given by equation (4.6). The first vector is normalized on housing prices, i.e.
βph,1 = 1, while the second vector is normalized on household debt, i.e. βd,2 = 1. Moreover,
exact identification is achieved in two steps. First, we exclude the housing turnover from
the housing price equation, i.e. βth,1 = 0, and second, we assume that housing prices and
housing stock have the same effect on household debt, i.e. βph,2 = βh,2. In addition, no
structural trend break occurs in the housing price equation, that is, we set βsb,1 = 0. As
a result, the cointegration matrix is given by
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
α2,ph α2,d
α3,ph α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 βR,1 0 βh,1 βt,1 0
βh,2 1 βyh,2 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 βt,2 βsb,2
 . (4.7)
Equation (4.7) represents the cointegration of our baseline model. The estimated coeffi-
cients are found in panel 0 in table 4.2.
The first restriction (panel 1) we impose is omitting the real after-tax interest rate from
the housing price vector, i.e. βR,1 = 0. Hence, the cointegration matrix corresponding to
panel 1 takes the form
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
α2,ph α2,d
α3,ph α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 βt,1 0
βh,2 1 βyh,2 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 βt,2 βsb,2
 . (4.8)
The second restriction (panel 2) is to drop real disposable income from the debt equation,
i.e. βyh,2 = 0. The cointegration matrix is then given by
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Π =

α1,ph α1,d
α2,ph α2,d
α3,ph α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 βt,1 0
βh,2 1 0 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 βt,2 βsb,2
 . (4.9)
The third imposed restriction (panel 3) is that there is no effect of disequilibrium in the
housing market on household debt, i.e. α2,ph = 0. Equation (4.10) shows the correspond-
ing cointegration matrix:
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
0 α2,d
α3,ph α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 βt,1 0
βh,2 1 0 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 βt,2 βsb,2
 . (4.10)
In the next step (panel 4), we exclude the trend from both vectors, i.e. βt,1 = βt,2 = 0.
The cointegration matrix turns into
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
0 α2,d
α3,ph α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 0 0
βh,2 1 0 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 0 βsb,2
 . (4.11)
Fifth, we assume that there is no structural trend break in the debt equation, i.e. βsb,2 = 0.
The corresponding cointegration is then given by
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
0 α2,d
α3,ph α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 0 0
βh,2 1 0 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 0 0
 . (4.12)
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Finally, we assume no effect of disequilibrium in the housing market on real disposable
income, i.e. α3,ph = 0. Equation (4.13) represents the final cointegration matrix given by
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
0 α2,d
0 α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 0 0
βh,2 1 0 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 0 0
 . (4.13)
4.3.6 Results
Table 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the development when imposing the restrictions above. We
report both the alpha10 and beta coefficients as well as their standard errors (in paren-
thesis). In each panel, we report a likelihood ratio (LR) test which tests the restrictions
from panel i to panel i− 1 on the one hand, and a LR test which tests all the restrictions
in panel i to the model without any restrictions on the other hand.
In general, we considered the t-values ex-ante for choosing new restrictions and checked
their validity ex-post with LR tests. The restrictions imposed in panel 2 and 3, however,
are the result of following Anundsen and Jansen’ approach. The restriction in panel 2
is justified by the LR test, whereas the restriction in panel 3 is rejected by the LR test.
Nonetheless, the result of the likelihood ratio test in the final specification indicates that
also this restriction is valid.
Panel 6 reports the final specification which slightly differs from Anundsen and Jansen.
While they imposed weak exogeneity of disposable income, we chose only one restriction,
namely that disequilibrium in the housing market does not affect disposable income.
All the coefficients are significant and have the expected sign. The long run effects on
housing prices can be summarized as follows:
10The alpha coefficients are reported in Appendix E.
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• A 1% increase in real household debt increases real housing prices by 1.44%.
• A 1% increase in real disposable income leads to a 2.53% increase in housing prices.
• A 1% increase in the housing stock lowers real housing prices by 5.06%.
The long run effects on household debt are:
• A 1% increase in real housing prices leads to a rise in real household debt by 0.75%.
• A 1 percentage point increase in the real after-tax interest rate decreases real house-
hold debt by 1.36%.
• A 1% increase in the housing turnover increases real household debt by 0.19%.
• A 1% increase in the housing stock leads to a 0.75% increase in real household debt.
The main point of re-estimating this particular model was to find evidence of the existence
of a financial accelerator between housing prices and credit, as well as to ensure that the
model can be used for our further analysis. As noted above, our estimation produces
meaningful and significant results. In addition, the positive coefficients for real household
debt in the housing price equation and for real housing prices in the household debt
equation show that there is a financial accelerator at work.
Consequently, this model is well-suited for our further analysis.
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4.3.7 Comparison with Anundsen and Jansen’s estimation
Table 4.4 compares our findings with the results in the original article by Anundsen and
Jansen (2013). Even though we use a longer time period, revised data and impose slightly
different restrictions, all the coefficients have the same signs. Some of the estimates
hardly differ in their values, e.g. household debt and housing stock in the debt equation,
while the difference is greater in other variables, e.g. real disposable income and housing
stock in the housing prices equation. Furthermore, all beta coefficients are significant in
our estimation, while this was not the case in Anundsen and Jansen’s estimation. They
reported an insignificant coefficient for the real after-tax interest rate, and this coefficient
was twice as big as our estimate measured in absolute terms. Nonetheless, the similar
results represent a further justification of our model choice.
Heer and Lund Anundsen and Jansen
1986 Q4 – 2013 Q3 1986 Q4 – 2008 Q4
β ph d ph d
ph - 0.75
(−)
- 0.76
(−)
d 1.44
(0.27)
- 0.98
(0.19)
-
yh 2.53
(0.58)
- 1.69
(0.63)
-
R - −1.36
(0.57)
- −2.74
(1.79)
th - 0.19
(0.07)
- 0.28
(0.15)
h −5.09
(1.29)
0.75
(0.05)
−3.03
(1.15)
0.76
(0.16)
α ph d ph d
ph −0.30
(0.05)
−0.26
(0.06)
−0.24
(0.04)
−0.10
(0.03)
d - −0.05
(0.03)
- −0.04
(0.01)
yh - 0.11
(0.03)
- -
Table 4.4: Comparison with Anundsen and Jansen’s estimation.
5 Effect of LTV restrictions on aggre-
gate household debt
In this chapter, we analyze the effect of the LTV restrictions imposed in March 2010 and
December 2011 on aggregate household debt. Intuitively, the LTV restrictions should
prevent households with limited equity — mostly young people — from obtaining or
increasing mortgages, while the wealthier households should remain unaffected. Thus,
the hypothesis is that
the LTV restrictions dampen aggregate real household debt.
This chapter is structured as following: In section 5.1, we explain the methodology and
derive the extended model specification. In section 5.2, we present the estimation results,
which we discuss in section 5.3.
5.1 Empirical model
In order to analyze the effect of the LTV restrictions, we extend the model from the previ-
ous chapter by introducing dummy variables which are restricted to lie in the cointegration
space. In this way, we are able to investigate the long run effect of the LTV restrictions.
We further assume that the LTV restrictions directly affect household debt. In addition,
housing prices are indirectly affected through a change in credit. As a consequence, the
dummy variables only enter the debt equation. Empirically, we handle this issue by im-
posing restrictions on the beta parameters of the dummy variables in the housing price
equation.
36
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Furthermore, we apply two different approaches. Firstly, we assume that both LTV
restrictions have the same effect on household debt (subsection 5.1.1) and secondly, we
distinguish between the two LTV restrictions and allow them to have a different impact
on household debt (subsection 5.1.2). The first case can be seen as a natural experiment,
where we compare household debt before and after a policy change, while the latter also
analyzes the effect of tightening the LTV restrictions..
5.1.1 No distinction between LTV restrictions
In this case, we do not distinguish between the LTV restriction from March 2010 (max
90% LTV) and December 2011 (max 85% LTV). Hence, we introduce a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 for the period 2010 Q2 – 2013 Q3 and 0 otherwise:
LTVt =
1 if t ≥ 2010 Q2,0 if t < 2010 Q2. (5.1)
The cointegration matrix is then given by
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
0 α2,d
0 α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 0 0 0
βh,2 1 0 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 0 0 βL,2
 , (5.2)
where βL,2 denotes the long-run effect of introducing LTV restrictions on household debt.
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5.1.2 Distinction between LTV restrictions
In this set-up, we allow the LTV restriction from March 2010 (max 90% LTV) and De-
cember 2011 (max 85% LTV) to have different impacts on household debt. Hence, we
introduce two dummy variables:
LTV 2010t =
1 if 2010 Q2 ≤ t ≤ 2011 Q4,0 otherwise, (5.3)
and
LTV 2012t =
1 if t ≥ 2012 Q1,0 otherwise, (5.4)
The corresponding cointegration matrix is then given by
Π =

α1,ph α1,d
0 α2,d
0 α3,d

 1 βd,1 βyh,1 0 0 βh,1 0 0 0 0
βh,2 1 0 βR,2 βth,2 βh,2 0 0 βL1,2 βL2,2
 , (5.5)
where βL1,2 and βL2,2 reveal the long-run effect of the LTV restriction of 90% and 85%,
respectively.
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5.2 Results
Table 5.1 summarizes the estimation results when imposing dummy variables according
to the specification given in equation (5.2) and (5.5).
LTV LTV 2010/2011
β ph d ph d
LTV - −0.01
(0.03)
- -
LTV 2010 - - - 0.001
(0.04)
LTV 2012 - - - −0.01
(0.04)
ph - 0.76
(−)
*** - 0.76
(−)
***
d 1.45
(0.27)
*** - 1.43
(0.28)
*** -
yh 2.52
(0.60)
*** - 2.61
(0.62)
*** -
R - −1.33
(0.57)
** - −1.31
(0.60)
**
th - 0.18
(0.07)
** - 0.19
(0.07)
**
h −5.08
(1.30)
*** 0.76
(0.06)
*** −4.21
(1.33)
*** 0.76
(0.06)
***
α ph d ph d
ph −0.30
(0.05)
*** −0.26
(0.06)
*** −0.29
(0.05)
*** −0.25
(0.06)
***
d - −0.05
(0.03)
* - −0.05
(0.03)
*
yh - 0.11
(0.03)
*** - 0.11
(0.03)
***
Observations n = 110 n = 110
Log-likelihood: 1028.0082 1028.0806
LR test1: χ2(9) = 19.06 [0.02] χ2(10) = 21.32 [0.02]
Table 5.1: Effect of LTV restrictions on aggregate household debt. Standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. Significance: p-value ≤ 0.01: ***, p-value ≤ 0.05: **, p-value
≤ 0.1: *. Estimation period: 1986 Q4 – 2013 Q3.
1Log likelihood ratio test of restrictions from panel i to the model without restrictions.
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First of all, in the specification which does not distinguish between the two LTV restric-
tions, the estimated coefficient has the expected negative sign, but is not significant. In
addition, the coefficient is rather small. Secondly, when distinguishing between the LTV
restrictions of 90% and 85%, the estimated effects differ in signs. In addition, they are
insignificant and negligible from an economic point of view. Lastly, we note that the
coefficients of the control variables are fairly stable in both specifications, that is, they
hardly change in value and are still significant.
5.3 Discussion
As seen in the previous section, it turns out that the LTV restrictions appear to have
failed to dampen real household debt on an aggregate level. These results are in line with
the findings of Igan and Kang (2011), who did not find a negative link between tightening
macroprudential tools and credit growth among households in South Korea, despite their
initial expectations. On the contrary, Wong et al. (2011) found that LTV restrictions had
a dampening effect on household leverage in Hong Kong. However, as mentioned earlier
in this thesis, both of these models ignored the bi-directional causality between household
debt and housing prices, and may therefore suffer from endogeneity problems.
The question is why the LTV restrictions apparently have failed to dampen the aggregate
household debt in Norway. More specifically, what can explain the insignificant result
in our model? The insignificant result may stem from three different sources. Firstly,
the restrictions are expected to constrain debt for particularly the younger part of the
population, while the older households may not be affected at all. If the LTV restrictions
have prevented young people from entering the credit market, the aggregated effect of this
reduction may have been — at least partly — offset by increased debt among older age
groups. Secondly, there are ways to avoid the LTV restrictions. As a result, the young
people may still have been able to enter the credit market, thus leaving aggregate house-
hold debt unaffected. Thirdly, our model may suffer from an omitted variable bias since
we do not control for variables such as population growth or the degree of centralization.
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The LTV restrictions are assumed to have had the intended reduction in household debt for
the young group. However, the old generation may have supported the young generation
by directly buying dwellings for them. Hence, the fall in debt for the young generation
was counteracted by a rise in the old generation’s debt. Another explanation is that
parents and their children could have chosen to jointly invest in a dwelling. In this
case, we would expect to see a slight decrease in the younger generation’s debt, while
the older generation’s debt increases a bit more relative to the situation without LTV
restrictions. Finally, the habit of holding debt might have changed among old people,
implying that the fall in the young generation’s debt has been offset by the old generation’s
growth in debt. More specifically, the older generation may have used the increase in their
wealth for buying even more expensive houses on the one hand, that is, they increased
their mortgages, or they increased their existing loans to finance greater consumption
expenditures on the other hand. The latter effect is discussed in Mian and Sufi (2011)
and is described as home equity-based borrowing. Even though the last reason is not
linked to the LTV restrictions, it might be a reason for the insignificant effect of the LTV
restrictions on aggregate household debt.
The second hypothesis is that there are ways to avoid the LTV restrictions. The high
growth in housing prices the last two decades has led to a strong increase in net worth
for the older generations participating in the housing market. A higher level of wealth
and the opportunity to increase existing loans based on an increased value of collateral,
give rise to several opportunities in supporting the younger generation. Firstly, they can
finance the amount of capital required to meet the LTV restrictions through an advance
in inheritance or private loans. Secondly, the older generation can serve as guarantors.
Yet another option to counter the LTV restrictions may have been the State Housing
Bank, which has granted loans to people originally subject to the LTV restrictions. As
a matter of fact, the amount of start-up loans has increased from 3.4 billion NOK to 7
billion NOK over the time period from 2007 to 2013. Thus, the State Housing Bank’s
lending practices may have undermined the policy requirement and even counteracted it.
As a consequence, young people have still been able to enter the credit market after the
introduction of the LTV restrictions, and this may explain why there is no significant fall
in aggregate household debt.
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Another explanation is that the insignificant results may be due to an underspecified
model. For instance, we did not control for population growth due to the lack of quarterly
data prior to 1997 Q4. All else equal, a larger population will be expected to hold a higher
level of aggregate debt. As a matter of fact, numbers from Statistics Norway show that
the average population growth in the years before 2010 was lower than in the period
from 2010–20132. This increase partly stems from an increase in net immigration3. Thus,
a potential effect from the LTV restrictions on aggregate debt may be disguised by an
increased population.
Another omitted variable which may have an impact on aggregated household debt is
the increasing urbanization in Norway. When people move to urban areas, they usually
pay a higher price for dwellings than in the districts, and are thus expected to increase
their mortgages. According to Statistics Norway, the number of inhabitants in urban
settlements increased by 60 000, or 1.5% in 2011 (Statistics Norway, 2012). In addition,
almost 90% of the growth in the population of Norway in 2011 took place in the urban
settlements. As before, not taking increasing urbanization into account may disguise the
effect of the LTV restrictions on aggregate household debt.
In general, the insignificant results may be due to a combination of the reasons given
above. The central question which arises is whether the LTV restrictions have had a
different impact on household debt across age groups. We will therefore use a different
model in the next chapter in order to find evidence for this hypothesis.
2Annual population growth rate (calculated based on numbers from Statistics Norway): 0.66% on
average in 1987–2009 and 1.27% on average in 2010–2013.
3Annual net immigration (calculated based on numbers from Statistics Norway): 22,000 on average
in 1999–2009 and 44,000 on average in 2010–2012.
6 Effect of LTV restrictions on house-
hold debt across age groups
Following the discussion in section 5.3, one possible reason for the insignificant effect of
the LTV restrictions on aggregate household debt was that the distribution of debt across
age groups might have changed. More precisely, our hypothesis is that
the LTV restrictions cause the older group to accumulate debt faster,
while the younger and poorer group is kept off the credit market to
some extent, and accumulates debt slower.
In order to find evidence supporting this hypothesis, we build a simple single-equation
model in section 6.2 which differs from the previous model due to the lack of quarterly
data. The estimation results are summarized and discussed in section 6.3.
6.1 Data set
In order to investigate the effect of the LTV restrictions on household debt across age
groups, we use a panel data set with slightly different variables for household debt and
income, as the previously used variables are only available on aggregate levels 1. These
two variables are divided by the number of persons in each group in order to control for
population growth and demographic changes. The variables thus enter the regression on
1See appendix A.2. Note that we replace disposable income with income, since disposable income was
not available for each group.
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per capita form. Both variables are provided by Statistics Norway and are measured on
a yearly frequency. The data set starts in 1993 and ends in 2012.
The original data set distinguishes between 6 age groups. To simplify the interpretation
of the results, we reduce the number of age groups and distinguish only between young
and old. The young group consists of persons from age 17 to 44 years, while the old group
contains all persons of age 45 years or older.
Group index i Dummy variable Age
1 - 17-44
2 old 45+
Table 6.1: Age groups.
6.2 Model specification and methodology
6.2.1 Age group model
Our starting point is the theoretical debt equation introduced in section 4.1,
Dt = g(PHt, Y Ht, Rt, THt, Ht), (6.1)
which together with the housing price equation determines the relationship between hous-
ing prices and household debt. Since we do not have enough observations to apply the
previous model, we have to change the empirical specification and use a single equation
for debt only. Moreover, we consider only short run effects with this particular model.
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Firstly, we introduce a dummy variable for the older generation:
oldi =
1 if i = 2,0 otherwise, (6.2)
where i is the group index defined in table 6.1.
Secondly, we define dummy variables for the LTV restriction in March 2010,
LTV 1t =
1 if 2010 ≤ t ≤ 2011,0 otherwise, (6.3)
and in December 2011,
LTV 2t =
1 if t = 2012,0 otherwise, (6.4)
as well as a dummy variable when not distinguishing between the two LTV restrictions:
LTVt =
1 if t ≥ 2010,0 otherwise. (6.5)
Thirdly, we assume that the housing stock has no impact on household debt in the short
run. Consequently, we are left with the following exogenous variables: real housing prices,
real income, real after-tax interest rate and housing turnover. Note the difference between
this single-equation model and the previous model: While we have to treat housing prices
and income as exogenous in this particular model, they are endogenous in the previous
model.
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Finally, we include a trend variable t. Hence, our Age group model is given by:
debtit = β0 + α0t + β1pht + β2incit + β3Rt + β4tht + ai + uit, (6.6)
where real household debt, debt, and real income, inc, vary both over time and between
groups, while the control variables real housing prices, ph, real after-tax interest rate, R,
and housing turnover, th, vary only over time, but not between groups. The error term uit
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the exogenous variables, while the variable ai denotes
fixed effects, which vary between groups, but are constant over time. Further, we rewrite
equation (6.6) as a 1. difference equation:
Δdebtit = α0 + β1Δpht + β2Δincit + β3ΔRt + β4Δtht + uit. (6.7)
Note that both the constant term and the fixed effects have disappeared. Further, the
new constant term is the coefficient in front of the trend variable in equation (6.6).
In the next step, we include the dummy variables for the LTV restrictions. Moreover,
we allow the two groups to have a different trend in household debt before and after the
LTV restrictions by including the group dummy variable oldi as well as interaction terms.
Hence, when we do not distinguish between the two LTV restrictions, the equation takes
the form
Δdebtit = α0 + δ0oldi + β1Δpht + β2Δincit + β3ΔRt + β4Δtht
+ δ1LTVt + γ1LTVt ∙ oldi + uit.
(6.8)
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When we do distinguish between the two LTV restrictions, the model is given by
Δdebtit = α0 + δ0oldi + β1Δpht + β2Δincit + β3ΔRt + β4Δtht
+ δ1LTV 1t + φ1LTV 1t ∙ oldi + δ2LTV 2t + φ2LTV 2t ∙ oldi + uit.
(6.9)
6.2.2 Methodology
Equation (6.8) and (6.9) will be estimated using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
Moreover, equation (6.8) and (6.9) have been specified such that we can apply the
difference-in-difference method. This particular method works as follows: First, we com-
pute the difference in household debt between the two age groups before and after the
introduction of the LTV restrictions, and second, we compute the difference of these two
differences. If this number is equal or close to zero, then the LTV restrictions have no
different impact on household debt between young and old. Alternatively, we could com-
pute the difference between before and after the LTV restrictions for the young group as
well as for the old group, and then compute the difference of those differences. In either
case, the difference-in-difference estimator is the same.
Particularly, the model specification given by equation (6.8) allows the different groups
to have different levels of debt everything else equal. Moreover, the effect of the LTV
restrictions is allowed to differ between the two age groups. More precisely, the difference
in debt between old and young before the LTV restrictions is given by (β0 + δ0)− β0 = δ0
and after the LTV restrictions the difference between old and young is measured by
(β0 + δ0 + δ1 + γ1) − (β0 + δ1) = δ0 + γ1. The difference-in-difference estimator is then
computed to be (δ0 + γ1)− δ0 = γ1, i.e. the coefficient in front of the interaction term of
the dummy variables LTV and old. In other words, the coefficient γ1 shows the different
impact of the LTV restrictions on household debt for the old generation when using the
young generation as reference group.
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LTV
before after
young β0 β0 + δ1
old β0 + δ0 β0 + δ0 + δ1 + γ1
diff (β0 + δ0)− β0 = δ0 (β0 + δ0 + δ1 + γ1)− (β0 + δ1) = δ0 + γ1
diff-in-diff - (δ0 + γ1)− δ0 = γ1
Table 6.2: Difference-in-difference estimator when not distinguishing between the two
LTV restrictions.
In an analogous manner, the coefficients φ1 and φ2 denote the difference-in-difference
estimators for the LTV restrictions from March 2010 and December 2011, respectively,
when distinguishing between the two LTV restrictions (equation (6.9)).
6.3 Results
Table 6.3 summarizes the estimation results for the Age group model. Residual diagnostics
show that the model does not suffer from serial correlation of first order, nor does it from
serial correlation of second order. Since the number of observations is rather low, the
results should be handled with care.
The control variables are highly significant and have the expected signs. The exception
is the real after-tax interest rate, which is highly significant, but instead of having the
expected negative impact on real household debt, its effect is estimated to be positive. As
argued in chapter 4, this might be due to the fact that there is a cointegrated relationship
between household debt and housing prices. As a consequence, the single-equation model
may suffer from an endogeneity problem, which means that OLS estimation may give
biased and inconsistent estimates.
Chapter 6. Effect of LTV restrictions on household debt across age groups 49
LTV LTV 2010/2011
Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 Panel 5
Δdebt Δdebt Δdebt Δdebt Δdebt
old - - 0.009
(0.0001)
*** - 0.009
(0.00002)
***
LTV - −0.014
(0.005)
*** −0.021
(0.0003)
*** - -
LTV ∙ old - - 0.013
(0.0002)
*** - -
LTV 1 - - - −0.023
(0.007)
*** −0.032
(0.002)
***
LTV 1 ∙ old - - - - 0.015
(0.0001)
***
LTV 2 - - - −0.001
(0.002)
−0.005
(0.001)
***
LTV 2 ∙ old - - - - 0.009
(0.0001)
***
Δph 0.187
(0.004)
*** 0.166
(0.004)
*** 0.157
(0.002)
*** 0.151
(0.006)
*** 0.141
(0.004)
***
Δinc 0.146
(0.038)
*** 0.127
(0.019)
*** 0.093
(0.012)
*** 0.109
(0.012)
*** 0.074
(0.004)
***
ΔR 0.412
(0.038)
*** 0.525
(0.081)
*** 0.547
(0.084)
*** 0.712
(0.126)
*** 0.742
(0.132)
***
Δth 0.001
(0.004)
0.017
(0.001)
*** 0.021
(0.0001)
*** 0.034
(0.004)
*** 0.039
(0.003)
***
constant 0.037
(0.005)
*** 0.041
(0.003)
*** 0.037
(0.0001)
*** 0.042
(0.003)
*** 0.039
(0.0004)
***
Observations n = 38 n = 38 n = 38 n = 38 n = 38
R2: 0.1285 0.1582 0.1977 0.1736 0.2149
AR(1) test2: 1.394
[0.163]
1.372
[0.170]
1.371
[0.170]
1.361
[0.173]
1.356
[0.175]
AR(2) test3: 1.388
[0.165]
1.347
[0.178]
1.358
[0.175]
1.341
[0.180]
1.344
[0.179]
Table 6.3: Results Age group model. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
thesis. Significance: p-value ≤ 0.01: ***, p-value ≤ 0.05: **, p-value ≤ 0.1: *. Estimation
period: 1994 – 2012.
2AR(1) test: Testing the null of no serial correlation of first order. Test statistics: N(0, 1). p-values
are reported in brackets.
3AR(2) test: Testing the null of no serial correlation of second order. Test statistics: N(0, 1). p-values
are reported in brackets.
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Considering table 6.3, our prime interest is directed towards the dummy variables and
their interaction terms.
First, panel 2 and 4 show the results when we do not allow for differences across age
groups. Then, real household debt is estimated to increase around 4% when there is no
change in the control variables. Moreover, the LTV restrictions are estimated to have
a dampening effect on real household debt. More precisely, when we do not distinguish
between the two LTV restrictions, the estimated growth rate is 1.4% lower after the LTV
restrictions. Then again, when we distinguish between the two LTV restrictions, the
growth rate is 2.3% lower after the LTV restriction in March 2010 on the one hand, and
0.1% lower after the LTV restriction in December 2011 on the other hand. The latter
effect is not only small from an economic point of view, but also insignificant.
Second, panel 3 and 5 show the results when we allow for differences across age groups.
Generally, when there is no change in fundamentals, real household debt is estimated to
increase with around 4% for the young generation, while the growth rate is slightly higher
for the old generation (around 5%). Moreover, the LTV restrictions are estimated to have
a negative impact on real household debt for the young generation, while the impact is
less negative or even positive (LTV in 2011) for the old generation. The isolated effect on
each age group’s growth rate in real household debt is summarized in table 6.4.
LTV LTV 2010 LTV 2011
young −0.021 −0.032 −0.005
old −0.008 −0.017 0.004
Table 6.4: Estimated effect of LTV restrictions on each age group’s growth rate in
real household debt.
Finally, in order to determine whether the impact on the young and old is different, we
compute the difference-in-difference estimator in table 6.5.
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LTV LTV 2010 LTV 2011
before after before after before after
young 0.037 0.016 0.039 0.007 0.039 0.034
old 0.046 0.038 0.048 0.031 0.048 0.052
diff 0.009 0.022 0.009 0.024 0.009 0.018
diff-in-diff - 0.013 - 0.015 - 0.009
Table 6.5: Estimated difference-in-difference estimator for LTV, LTV 2010 and
LTV 2011.
In the case where we do not distinguish between the two LTV restrictions, the difference
between the young and old group’s growth rate in real household debt before the LTV
restrictions is estimated to be 0.9 percentage points, while the difference after the impo-
sition is 2.2 percentage points. Hence, the difference-in-difference estimator is γˆ1 = 0.013,
that is, the reduction in household debt for the older group is 1.3 percentage points less
than for the younger group, which means that the gap between the old and young group’s
growth rate has increased.
When we make a distinction between the two LTV restrictions, the gap between the
growth rates is still 0.9 percentage points before the LTV imposition, even though the
estimated growth rates are slightly higher. After the LTV restriction in 2010, the gap has
increased to 2.4 percentage points, which in turn has resulted in a difference-in-difference
estimator equal to φˆ1 = 0.015. Analogously, the difference-in-difference estimator for the
LTV restriction in 2011 is estimated to be φˆ2 = 0.009, that is, the gap between the two
growth rates has widened by 0.9 percentage points.
Generally, the results indicate that the impact of the LTV restrictions is indeed different
across age groups. While there is a strong decrease in the young generation’s growth rate,
the older generation has reacted less to these measures, and even accumulated debt slightly
faster after the LTV restriction in 2011. Hence, the results confirm our hypothesis to some
extent. While the effect on the young group is negative as expected, the old generation’s
growth rate has only increased after the tighter restriction in 2011.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the effect of the loan-to-value (LTV) restrictions
introduced in March 2010 and December 2011 on Norwegian household debt.
After many years with high growth in household debt, Norway is among the countries with
the highest debt-to-income ratio worldwide. Several economists have pointed out that
such a high accumulation of household debt threatens financial stability and has severe
implications from a macroeconomic perspective. As a result, the FSA have introduced a
LTV restriction of 90% in 2010 and lowered it to 85% in 2011. The main goal of these
restrictions was to dampen the growth of household debt and housing prices.
Firstly, we re-estimated a model introduced by Anundsen and Jansen (2013) with an
extended data set, and found a cointegrated relationship between housing prices and
household debt. Moreover, the results indicate that there is indeed a financial accelerator
at work, that is, there are self-reinforcing effects between housing prices and credit in the
long run. These results are in line with the findings in Anundsen and Jansen (2013), Fitz-
patrick and McQuinn (2007), and Gimeno and Martinez-Carrascal (2010). Consequently,
it is crucial to take this bi-directional causality between housing prices and credit into
account when analyzing the effect of LTV restrictions.
Secondly, in order to analyze the question of interest, we extended the benchmark model
by including dummy variables for the LTV restrictions in 2010 and 2012. Our findings
indicate that the LTV restrictions have failed to have a significant effect on aggregate
household debt. Hence, the results are in contrast with the evidence from similar studies
such as Wong et al. (2011) and Price (2014), but in line with the study from Igan and
Kang (2011). The insignificant result cried for explanation and we outlined three different
causes. Firstly, the LTV restrictions may have failed to prevent a sufficient amount of
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people from entering the credit market due to (grand)parent financing and start-up loans
from the State Housing Bank. Secondly, a potential decline in the younger generation’s
debt may have been counteracted by a rise in the older generation’s debt. Finally, our
model may suffer from omitted variable bias since we did not control for variables such as
population growth and urbanization due to the lack of quarterly data.
Thirdly, in order to substantiate our hypotheses, we derived a single-equation model
which allowed us to study the impact of the LTV restrictions on household debt across
age groups. In this particular model, we controlled for population growth as well as
demographic changes. As expected, the results indicate that the LTV restrictions had a
dampening effect on the growth in debt among the young. Then again, the impact on
debt among the elderly is less clear. The estimates revealed a slight reduction in growth
in debt after the LTV restriction in 2010, whereas debt was estimated to grow faster again
after the tightening of the LTV restriction. Causality is not that clear in this case, and
the increased growth rate may be the result of (grand)parent financing and/or a change
in the willingness of holding debt among the elderly.
In general, we conclude that the LTV restrictions are likely to increase financial stabil-
ity through decreasing the speed of debt accumulation among young people, who hold
over 60% of total household debt. However, they seem to have failed the initial aim of
dampening the aggregate amount of household debt, which still remains a threat to the
Norwegian economy. LTV restrictions can therefore be seen as a valuable tool for reduc-
ing the accumulation of debt among the most sensitive group. They may, however, have
limited power to dampen household debt on an aggregate level.
Our study has two main shortcomings. Firstly, the number of observations after the intro-
duction of the LTV restrictions is relatively low. Secondly, the model used to analyze the
effect on aggregate household debt may suffer from omitted variables, while the Age group
model does not take the cointegrated relationship between housing prices and household
debt into account. In this context, further research is needed. New and more reliable
evidence may be provided by including potential omitted variables as well as applying
a richer data set. In addition, a cross-section analysis between countries may allow to
isolate the effect of LTV restrictions and will probably produce more precise estimates.
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A Appendix: Data definitions
A.1 Data used in the Housing prices and debt model
All data are seasonally unadjusted and measured on a quarterly basis. Except for the
interest rate all variables are transformed to log scale in the empirical analysis.
Variable Data description Source
pc The consumption deflator in the National Accounts. Statistics Norway
ph Hedonic housing price index measuring average housing
prices in Norway (PBOL). The housing price index is
deflated by pc.
Statistics Norway
d Total amount of outstanding gross household debt
(BG300). Deflated by pc.
Statistics Norway
yh Households’ disposable income (RD300), excluding eq-
uity income (RAM300). Deflated by pc.
Statistics Norway
h Real housing stock measured in fixed prices (K83).
Measures the total stock of housing in Norway and is
calculated according to the perpetual inventory method.
Statistics Norway
th The housing turnover measures the number of housing
transactions.
Statistics Norway
i Nominal interest rate paid by households on loans in
private financial institutions (RENPF300).
Statistics Norway
p Consumer price index (KPI). Statistics Norway
π Annual inflation rate (π = Δ4p). Statistics Norway
τ Capital tax rate (TRTMNW ). After a tax reform in
1992, τ has been constant at 0.28.
Statistics Norway
R Real annual after-tax interest rate (R = 4i ∙ (1− τ)−π). Statistics Norway
Table A.1: Data used in the Housing prices and debt model.
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A.2 Data used in the Age group model
All data are measured on a yearly basis. Except for the interest rate all variables are
transformed to log scale in the empirical analysis.
Variable Data description Source
pc The consumption deflator in the National Accounts. Statistics Norway
ph Hedonic housing price index measuring average housing
prices in Norway (PBOL). The housing price index is
deflated by pc.
Statistics Norway
N Number of residents 17 years and older (tax statistics). Statistics Norway
debt Real household debt per capita. Gross household debt
(tax statistics) divided by N and deflated by pc.
Statistics Norway
inc Real income per capita. Gross income (tax statistics)
divided by N and deflated by pc.
Statistics Norway
th The housing turnover measures the number of housing
transactions.
Statistics Norway
i Nominal interest rate paid by households on loans in
private financial institutions (RENPF300).
Statistics Norway
p Consumer price index (KPI). Statistics Norway
π Annual inflation rate (π = Δ4p). Statistics Norway
τ Capital tax rate (TRTMNW ). After a tax reform in
1992, τ has been constant at 0.28.
Statistics Norway
R Real annual after-tax interest rate (R = 4i ∙ (1− τ)−π). Statistics Norway
Table A.2: Data used in the Age group model.
B Appendix: Stationarity tests
B.1 Real housing prices
ph 
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Figure B.1: Time series and ACF function (1984 Q1 – 2013 Q3).
Variable Lags Constant Trend Season DW t-adf Crit. value 5%
ph 5 yes yes yes 1.546 −2.845 −3.45
Δph 4 yes no yes 1.539 −3.260 −2.89
Table B.1: ADF test (1986 Q2 – 2013 Q3).
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B.2 Real household debt
d 
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Figure B.2: Time series and ACF function (1984 Q1 – 2013 Q3).
Variable Lags Constant Trend Season DW t-adf Crit. value 5%
d 4 yes yes no 2.280 −2.702 −3.45
Δd 3 yes no no 2.286 −2.944 −2.89
Table B.2: ADF test (1986 Q2 – 2013 Q3).
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B.3 Real disposable income
yh 
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Figure B.3: Time series and ACF function (1984 Q1 – 2013 Q3).
Variable Lags Constant Trend Season DW t-adf Crit. value 5%
yh 5 yes yes yes 1.984 −0.766 −3.45
Δyh 4 yes no yes 2.015 −5.061 −2.89
Table B.3: ADF test (1986 Q2 – 2013 Q3).
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B.4 Real after-tax interest rate
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Figure B.4: Time series and ACF function (1984 Q1 – 2013 Q3).
Variable Lags Constant Trend Season DW t-adf Crit. value 5%
R 4 yes yes no 1.841 −2.847 −3.45
ΔR 3 yes no no 1.858 −6.848 −2.89
Table B.4: ADF test (1986 Q2 – 2013 Q3).
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B.5 Housing turnover
th 
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Figure B.5: Time series and ACF function (1985 Q2 – 2013 Q3).
Variable Lags Constant Trend Season DW t-adf Crit. value 5%
th 2 yes yes yes 2.137 −1.810 −3.45
Δth 1 yes no yes 2.221 −10.09 −2.89
Table B.5: ADF test (1987 Q2 – 2013 Q3).
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B.6 Real housing stock
h 
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Figure B.6: Time series and ACF function (1984 Q1 – 2013 Q3).
Variable Lags Constant Trend Season DW t-adf Crit. value 5%
h 5 yes yes no 1.833 −1.603 −3.45
Δh 4 yes no no 1.850 −2.634 −2.89
Δ2h 3 yes no no 1.839 −2.942 −2.89
Table B.6: ADF test (1986 Q2 – 2013 Q3).
C Appendix: Lag length tests
Table C.1 and C.2 show the results of the lag reduction tests for the exogenous variables
in the unrestricted VARX.
• Endogenous variables: Real housing prices, real household debt, real disposable
income.
• Restricted variables: Real after-tax interest rate, housing turnover, housing stock,
deterministic trend and a dummy variable for the structural break in the time series
for real household debt.
• Unrestricted variables: Constant and centered seasonal dummies.
C.1 Lag reduction test: Information criteria
Lags log likelihood SC HQ AIC
7 1054.7704 −13.550 −15.888 −16.977
6 1050.1381 −13.724 −15.673 −17.003
5 1045.4042 −13.897 −15.757 −17.026
4 1039.9761 −14.056 −15.828 −17.037
3 1031.4725 −14.159 −15.842 −16.990
2 1029.3262 −14.379 −15.974 −17.062
1 1023.2662 −14.527 −16.033 −17.060
0 1017.3948 −14.679 −16.096 −17.063
Table C.1: Lag reduction test: Information criteria (1986 Q4 – 2013 Q3).
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C.2 Lag reduction test: F-test and LR test
Tests of lag reduction F-test, LR test F-statistic p-value
7 to 6 χ2(6) 9.265 [0.1592]
7 to 5 χ2(12) 18.732 [0.0952]
7 to 4 χ2(18) 29.589 [0.0416]
7 to 3 χ2(24) 46.596 [0.0038]
7 to 2 χ2(30) 50.888 [0.0100]
7 to 1 χ2(36) 63.008 [0.0035]
7 to 0 χ2(42) 74.751 [0.0014]
6 to 5 F(6,124) 0.9260 [0.4788]
6 to 4 F(12,164) 1.0095 [0.4425]
6 to 3 F(18,175) 1.2699 [0.2127]
6 to 2 F(24,180) 1.0684 [0.3841]
6 to 1 F(30,182) 1.1249 [0.3108]
6 to 0 F(36,183) 1.1638 [0.2565]
5 to 4 F(6,128) 1.0996 [0.3662]
5 to 3 F(12,169) 1.4478 [0.1489]
5 to 2 F(18,181) 1.1194 [0.3366]
5 to 1 F(24,186) 1.1781 [0.2668]
5 to 0 F(30,188) 1.2147 [0.2174]
4 to 3 F(6,132) 1.8022 [0.1034]
4 to 2 F(12,174) 1.1280 [0.3403]
4 to 1 F(18,187) 1.2021 [0.2628]
4 to 0 F(24,192) 1.2409 [0.2114]
3 to 2 F(6,136) 0.4550 [0.8404]
3 to 1 F(12,180) 0.8878 [0.5605]
3 to 0 F(18,192) 1.0343 [0.4234]
2 to 1 F(6,140) 1.3467 [0.2405]
2 to 0 F(12,185) 1.3464 [0.1957]
1 to 0 F(6,144) 1.3409 [0.2428]
Table C.2: Lag reduction test: F-test, LR test (1986 Q4 – 2013 Q3).
D Appendix: Structural break
This appendix explains the specification of the dummy variables used for controlling the
structural break occured in the debt statistics in 1995 Q4. We adopt an approach proposed
by Johansen et al. (2000), where we allow for both a structural break in the (restricted)
trend variable as well as in the (unrestricted) constant term.
D.1 Specification of dummy variables regarding a struc-
tural break
Our initial model is given by
ΔYt = α
β
γ

′

Yt−1
Xt−1
t

+
p∑
i=1
ΓiΔYt−i +
q−1∑
i=0
ΨiΔXt−i + Φ

μ
CS1t
CS2t
CS3t

+ εt, (D.1)
where Y is a 3×1 vector of the endogenous variables, X is a 3×1 vector of the exogenous
variables, t is the deterministic trend variable with the according parameter γ, μ = 1 is
the constant term, CS1, CS2 and CS3 are centered seasonal dummies, and ε is a 3 × 1
vector of the error term.
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First, we divide our sample into two subsamples. Let
1986 Q3 = T0 < T1 < T2 = 2013 Q3, (D.2)
where T1 = 1995 Q3 is the last observation in period 1.
Second, let
D2,t =
1 if t = T1,0 otherwise, for t = ...,−1, 0, 1, ... (D.3)
so D2,t−i is an indicator function of the ith observation in the 2nd period; that is, D2,t−i = 1
if t = T1 + i.
Third,
E2,t =
T2−T1∑
i=k+1
D2,t−i =
1 for T1 + k + 1 ≤ t ≤ T2,0 otherwise, (D.4)
is the effective sample of the 2nd period. It is convenient to gather the sample dummies
and the drift parameters for the different sample periods
Et = (1, E2,t)
′, μ = (μ1, μ2) = (1, 1), γ = (γ′1, γ
′
2)
′, (D.5)
of dimensions (2 × 1), (3× 2), (2× 2), respectively. The model equation becomes
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ΔYt = α
β
γ

′

Yt−1
Xt−1
t ∙ Et

+
p∑
i=1
ΓiΔYt−i +
q−1∑
i=0
ΨiΔXt−i + Φ

μ ∙ Et
CS1t
CS2t
CS3t

+
p∑
i=1
κ2,iD2,t−i + εt,
(D.6)
where the observations YT1+1, ..., YT1+p are held fixed as initial observations. Note, that
the effect of the dummy variables D2,t−1, ..., D2,t−p corresponding to the observations
XT2+1, ..., XT2+p is to render the corresponding residuals zero, thereby essentially elim-
inating the corresponding factors from the likelihood function, and hence the conditional
likelihood function given the initial values in each period.
E Appendix: Adjustment coefficients
n = 110 Panel 0 Panel 1 Panel 2
α ph d ph d ph d
ph 0.19
(0.05)
*** 0.25
(0.08)
*** 0.29
(0.09)
*** 0.32
(0.09)
*** −2.08
(0.61)
*** −3.32
(0.96)
***
d −0.03
(0.03)
−0.01
(0.05)
−0.02
(0.05)
−0.10
(0.05)
* 0.88
(0.35)
** 1.33
(0.55)
**
yh −0.09
(0.03)
*** −0.02
(0.05)
−0.19
(0.06)
*** −0.10
(0.06)
0.39
(0.40)
0.76
(0.62)
n = 110 Panel 3 Panel 4 Panel 5
α ph d ph d ph d
ph −0.76
(0.13)
*** −0.92
(0.16)
*** −0.51
(0.02)
*** −0.42
(0.01)
*** −0.33
(0.06)
*** −0.29
(0.06)
***
d - −0.05
(0.03)
- −0.04
(0.01)
*** - −0.05
(0.03)
yh 0.10
(0.10)
0.25
(0.12)
* 0.12
(0.07)
0.19
(0.06)
*** 0.03
(0.05)
0.13
(0.05)
***
n = 110 Panel 6
α ph d
ph −0.30
(0.05)
*** −0.26
(0.06)
***
d - −0.05
(0.03)
*
yh - 0.11
(0.03)
***
Table E.1: General-to-specific modelling: Adjustment coefficients. Standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. Significance: p-value ≤ 0.01: ***, p-value ≤ 0.05: **, p-value
≤ 0.1: *. Estimation period: 1986 Q4 – 2013 Q3.
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F Appendix: Guidelines
F.1 Guidelines for prudent residential mortgage lend-
ing practices issued by the FSA
1. Thoroughgoing process. Before granting or increasing a home mortgage loan,
the bank must have accurate information on borrowers’ income and overall debt
(including joint debt in a housing cooperative), normally by obtaining tax assess-
ment data on current salary or other income, and on the property to be mortgaged,
based on a prudent valuation.
2. Sufficient debt servicing capacity. The bank should have in place procedures
for calculating borrowers’ capacity to repay their mortgages with a basis in income,
expenses, servicing of overall debt in the form of interest and instalments (liquidity
surplus) and the consequences of an interest rate increase; see point 8. Where the
borrower is shown to incur a liquidity deficit in the event of an interest rate increase,
the loan should as a rule not be granted, and the borrower should in all such cases
be dissuaded from taking up the loan.
3. Loan-to-Value ratio. The bank must have in place procedures for assessing col-
lateral and the borrowers’ aggregate mortgage debt to ensure a margin relative to
property value. A mortgage loan may not normally exceed 85 per cent of the prop-
erty’s market value, where the loan-to-value ratio includes all loans secured on the
property. It would also be natural to take the borrowers’ overall equity capital
situation into consideration when determining the loan-to-value ratio.
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4. Additional collateral. In the event of deviation from the norms in points 2, 3, 6
and 7, either additional formal security in other property or an assurance of personal
security for parts of the loan (surety/guarantee) must be available or the bank must
have conducted a special prudential assessment. Criteria for prudential assessments
should be established by the board of directors of the banks concerned.
5. Instalments. Mortgage loans exceeding 70 per cent of property value should nor-
mally not require payment of instalments from the first due date, thereby building
up a more reassuring safety buffer.
6. Debt servicing capacity for home equity credit lines. Home equity credit lines
can pose an increased risk for banks, and guidelines must clarify which customer
groups are eligible for such facilities. Banks’ guidelines must state that when a
borrowers’ liquidity surplus is assessed, account should be taken of the fact that
debt servicing capacity may be significantly impaired during the period of credit due
to income reduction upon retirement etc. Where the borrower is required to repay
the loan in full upon expiry of the period of credit, banks should, when calculating
the borrower’s liquidity surplus, include interest and instalment payments as if the
credit has been granted as a repayment loan.
7. Loan-to-value ratio for home equity credit lines. Granting of home equity
credit lines must be based on a prudential assessment, and the loan should normally
not exceed 70 per cent of the property’s market value. Assessments should draw a
distinction between mortgage loans where repayment in full is required after expiry
of the period of credit and loans continuing for the borrower’s lifetime.
8. Consequences of an increase in interest rates. When assessing a borrower’s
ability to pay and possible dissuasion from taking out a mortgage, the bank must
make allowance for an interest rate increase of at least 5 percentage points from the
current level. It is important to make the borrower clearly aware of this. The bank
should in all cases make clear the consequences of choosing between a fixed rate and
a variable rate mortgage.
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9. Handling of deviations. Where the bank finds cause to deviate from its internal
guidelines based on these minimum requirements, the decision to do so must be
taken at a higher level than normally authorized to grant home mortgage loans.
10. Reporting. Each quarter a report shall be submitted to the bank’s board of direc-
tors or — in the case of foreign branches — the management, on compliance with
the guidelines for prudent home financing in which deviations from the guidelines
are identified and reported. Finanstilsynet will monitor compliance by reviewing
institutions’ replies to a questionnaire included in the home loan surveys, at ordi-
nary on-site inspections and thematic inspections of Norwegian institutions, and at
meetings with foreign branches. Finanstilsynet will also be entitled to inspect the
reports submitted to the board of directors or management.
